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Lim: Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA

NOTE

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL V. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY:
A CALL FOR
EVENHANDED APPLICATION OF
THE CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1972
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a stream running between two open fields. On one field,
the local municipality is constructing a neighborhood park. On the other,
a private energy company is constructing an oil well field to extract oil
from the ground. In both cases, bulldozers and earthmovers are moving
dirt around the site. I Now imagine that muddy water is running off of
both sites and into the stream. The sediment contained within the muddy
water starts to settle out and fill in the stream. 2 This eventually reduces

1 See Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Construction and Development
Point Source Category 73 Fed. Reg. 72,562, 72,564 (proposed Nov. 28, 2008) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 450) ("Construction activity typically involves site selection and planning, and land·
disturbing tasks such as clearing, excavating and grading.").
2 See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Regulations for Revision of the
Water Pollution Control Program Addressing Storm Water Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722, 68,728
(Dec. 8, 1999) {codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122·124 (Westlaw 2009». This document provides
support for the EPA's Phase II regulation of storm water discharges through the NPDES Program.
With regard to impacts to streams associated with construction site runoff, the EPA notes that
"[iJntroduction of coarse sediment (coarse sand or larger) or a large amount of fine sediment is also a
concern because of the potential of filling lakes and reservoirs (along with the associated
remediation costs for dredging), as well as clogging stream channels." Id.
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the habitat for aquatic species and could result in fish dying? Even
though both sites are allowing muddy water to enter the stream, only the
local municipality constructing the neighborhood park would be in
violation of the Clean Water Act of 1972 ("CW A"). The municipality
would be required to obtain a permit with the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") that would regulate any pollutant, including sediment,
coming off its construction site. Even though the private energy
company is polluting the stream in the same manner, the company would
be exempt from the CWA permitting requirements.
In 2006, the EPA created a permit exemption for oil and gas
construction sites if the only thing coming off the site was sediment. 4 As
a result, the hypothetical private energy company would have been
allowed to pollute the stream with the sediment from its construction site.
It is unfair that one construction site can get away with polluting a stream
while another construction site, with similar discharges, has to comply
with the CWA requirements. The EPA has a duty to apply its regulations
under the CWA evenhandedly.5 If the EPA treats like cases differently
without support for the distinction, then the EPA would fail to meet one
of its obligations under the CWA-to prohibit unlawful discharges
without a permit-and would not be performing its duties under the
CWA.
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA ("NRDC v. EPA"),
the Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC") challenged the EPA's
permit exemption for oil and gas construction sites as a violation of the
CWA, claiming that the exemption was inconsistent with the CWA's
goal of protecting the nation's waters. 6 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the EPA's rule was arbitrary and
capricious in light of the EPA's consistent, long-standing position of

3 See id. at 68,728-29 ("Large inputs of coarse sediment into stream channels initially will
reduce stream depth and minimize habitat complexity by filling in pools").
4 Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 2008),526 F.3d 591, 600 (9th Cir. 2008). The
EPA created a permit exemption for oil and gas consttuction sites after the passage of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005, in which Congress amended the definition of oil and gas exploration and
production to include consttuction sites. The EPA believed that Congress amended the definition in
order to extend existing exemptions for oil and gas operations to oil and gas consttuction sites. Id.
S See Distrigas of Mass. Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 517 F.2d 761, 765 (1st Cir. 1975)
("[An administrative agency) has a duty to define and apply its policies in a minimally responsible
and evenhanded way.").
6 NRDC 2008, 526 F.3d at 601 ("NRDC and the other petitioners contend that [the) EPA's
final rule and regulation, which exempts from NPDES permitting the runoff of sediment-laden storm
water from oil and gas consttuction activities, contravenes Congressional intent and constitutes an
impermissible interpretation of section 402(1)(2) of the CW A, as amended by the Energy Policy Act
of 2005.").
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requiring permits for sediment discharges. 7 In addition, the Ninth Circuit
supported its reasoning with the fact that Congress did not specifically
mention the term "sediment" in the relevant statute or discuss what
should or should not be exempt from permitting. 8
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit correctly held that the
permit exemption was arbitrary and capricious not only because the EPA
changed its long-standing position on what it considered a contaminant,
but also because the permit exemption was manifestly contrary to the
CWA, as it allowed discharges of a known pollutant to go unregulated
from oil and gas construction sites. The permit exemption also lacked a
permitting scheme to ensure oil and gas construction sites were indeed
exempt. However, the court failed to address the EPA's attempt to carve
out an exemption for one segment of the construction industry, oil and
gas, and not for the rest of the construction industry. By not addressing
this issue, the court has left the door open for the EPA to create
exemptions that give preference to certain segments of the industry, but
not to others in similar situations.
Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of the CWA; a
description of how sediment is regulated under the CWA; an explanation
of the existing exemption for oil and gas operations; and a summary of
the Chevron deference test, which the Ninth Circuit used to analyze the
EPA's statutory interpretation of section 402(1)(2) of the CWA. Part II
summarizes the facts, procedural history, and majority and dissenting
opinions in NRDC v. EPA. Part III explains that the Ninth Circuit
correctly held that the EPA's permit exemption was arbitrary and
capricious. Part IV argues that the Ninth Circuit failed to address the
EPA's impermissible attempt to carve out an exemption for oil and gas
construction sites and not to other construction sites without support for
treating these like cases differently. By not addressing this issue, the
court left the door open for the EPA to attempt to create similar
exemptions without consideration of whether it gives preferential
treatment to one group and not to another group in a similar situation.

7 [d. at 607-08 ("[W]e conclude that [the] EPA's inconsistent and conflicting position
regarding the discharge of sediment-laden storm water from oil and gas construction sites causes its
interpretation of amended section 402(1)(2) ... to be arbitrary and capricious."); see also id. at 602
(stating that the EPA's permit exemption would be reviewed under the Administrative Policy Act,
codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06, which states that the court shall "set aside agency action ... found to
be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance to law.").
"Arbitrary" is defined as "founded on prejudice or preference rather than on reason or fact. This
type of decision is often termed arbitrary and capricious." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed.
2004).
8 NRDC 2008,526 F.3d at 608.
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I. BACKGROUND
NRDC v. EPA involved a challenge to the EPA's pennit exemption
for oil and gas construction activities with sediment-only discharges. 9 To
gain a general understanding of the issue, the following section will
provide a brief overview of the following: the purpose of the CWA; the
impacts of construction site sediment on the nation's waters; the
application of section 402 of the CWA to oil and gas sites; and the
Chevron deference test, under which the Ninth Circuit reviewed the
EPA's pennit exemption for oil and gas construction sites.
A. PURPOSE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT

Congress enacted the CWA in 1972 with the stated objective "to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the nation's waters.,,10 The CWA makes "discharge of pollutants"
unlawful except when discharges are in compliance with specified
sections of the CWA. 11 Congress expressly gave the EPA authority to
administer the CWA.12 Thus, Congress gave the EPA the authority to
use its best professional judgment and expertise to implement the CWA
in accordance with congressional goals for the CWA. 13
In carrying out the CWA, the EPA must minimize the amount of
pollutants that enter the nation's waters. 14 One way the EPA does this is
by requiring potential polluters to obtain pennits that would allow

9 Id. at 594. NRDC contended that the permit exemption was unlawful under the CW A and
asked the Ninth Circuit to vacate the rule. [d.
10 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (Westlaw 2008); Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for
the Construction and Development Point Source Category 73 Fed. Reg. 72,562, 72,564 (proposed
Nov. 28, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 450).
Ii 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(12) (Westlaw 2008) ("discharge ofa pollutant" means any addition of
any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source); 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(6) (Westlaw 2008)
("pollutant" means dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge,
munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded
equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into
water); 33 U.S.C.A, § 1311(a) (Westlaw 2008) (referencing specific sections of the CWA that would
permit pollutant discharges so long as discharges were in compliance with the conditions set forth in
the specified sections; any discharges not in compliance with these sections are unlawful).
12
33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(d) (Westlaw 2008) ("Except as otherwise expressly provided in this
chapter, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency... shall administer this
chapter.").
13 See NRDC 2008, 526 F.3d at 595 n.4 (quoting a conference report stating that the
"determination of whether storm water is contaminated is within the Administrator's discretion").
14 See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a), (d) (Westlaw 2008) (designating the EPA as the Administrator
of the CW A). The EPA, therefore, must administer the CW A consistent with the objectives of the
CWA.
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discharge of pollutants with certain limitations. 15 Section 402 of the
CWA describes the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") Program. 16 The EPA controls discharge of pollutants from
"point sources" into bodies of water through this program. 17 The EPA
requires dischargers to obtain NPDES permits, also referred to as storm
water discharge permits, in order to regulate pollutant discharges. 18
1. Construction Site Sediment

"Sediment is, by weight, the greatest pollutant of water resources.,,19
The EPA had expressed concern that construction activities, although
temporary in nature, were a major source of water quality issues that
required oversight and enforcement. 2o
The EPA asserted that
construction sites "contribute more sediment to streams than previously
When developing
deposited [naturally] over several decades. ,,21
regulations to control construction site discharges, the EPA referred to
several studies that documented the magnitude of sediment deposition

15 40 C.F.R. § 122.I(b)(I) (Westlaw 2009) ("The NPDES program requires permits for the
discharge of 'pollutants' from any 'point source' into 'waters of the Vnited States."').
16 See generally 33 V.S.C.A. § 1342(a)-(q) (Westlaw 2008) (outlining, among other things,
who can issue permits that allow discharge of pollutants, who can administer the NPDES program,
limitations on permit requirements, and how certain activities would be permitted).
17
33 V.S.C.A. § 1362(14) (Westlaw 2008) (defining "point source" to mean any discernible,
confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel,
conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or
vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged).
18 40 C.F.R. § 122.I(b)(1) (Westlaw 2009) (requiring storm water permits for pollutant
discharges into "waters of the Vnited States").
19 G. ALLAN BURTON, JR., & ROBERT E. PITT, STORMWATER EFFECTS HANDBOOK - A
TOOLBOX FOR WATERSHED MANAGERS, SCIENTISTS, AND ENGINEERS 32 (2002), available at
http://www .epa.gov/ednnrrnrl/pub licationslbookslhandbooklhirezhandbook. pdf.
20 See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Application Regulations for
Storm Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990, 48,033 (Nov. 16, 1990) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §
I 22.26(c)(1)(iii) (2006)).
21 Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 1992), 966 F.2d 1292, 1306 (9th Cir. 1992); see
also National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Regulations for Revision of the Water
Pollution Control Program Addressing Storm Water Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722, 68,728-29
(Dec. 8, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122-124 (Westlaw 2009)) (referencing several reports and
studies supporting the EPA's statements that streams were affected by construction activity that led
to stream impairment); Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Construction and
Development Point Source Category 73 Fed. Reg. 72,562, 72,564 (proposed Nov. 28, 2008) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pI. 450) ("Construction activity typically involves site selection and planning,
and land-disturbing tasks such as clearing, excavating and grading. Disturbed soil, if not managed
properly, can be easily washed off-site during storm events. Although streams and rivers naturally
carry sediment loads, discharges from construction activity can elevate these loads to levels above
those in undisturbed watersheds.").
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into streams. 22 One study documented that construction sites contributed
nineteen times the sediment contributed by agricultural areas. 23
Sediment discharges have been shown to extend far downstream from
the actual construction sites. 24 Because the impacts of sediment include
stream degradation, loss of fish habitat, increased flooding, and negative
impacts to recreation,25 the EPA requires a permit for a construction site
if the activity involves disturbance of one acre of land or more. 26 The
NPDES permit requires that sediment controls be in place to minimize
sediment from running off the construction site and into a waterway. 27

22 See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Regulations (NPDES) for Revision
of the Water Pollution Control Program Addressing Storm Water Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722,
68,729 (Dec. 8, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122-124 (Westlaw 2009» ("A highway
construction project in West Virginia disturbed only 4.2 percent of a 4.72-square-mile basin, but
resulted in a three-fold increase in suspended sediment yields .... During the largest storm event, it
was estimated that 80 percent of the sediment in the stream originated from the construction site ....
A 1970 study determined that sediment yields from construction areas can be as much as 500 times
the levels detected in rural areas.").
23 [d. (citing a m;:>nitoring study of sediment loads from three residential construction sites as
compared to an agricultural area).
24 [d. (referencing a study that documents the impact of construction site sediment
approximately 5.6 kilometers downstream from the construction site).
25 See David L. Hatchett, Regulation of Construction Site Stormwater Runoff: We Can Do
Beller Than This, 29 IND. L. REv. 153,155 (1995) ("The direct economic impacts of sedimentation
include water storage loss, flooding, dredging costs, water treatment and use, and damage to
fisheries. Water-based recreation also suffers damage from sedimentation ... due to destruction of
fish habitat, siltation of recreation activities, and eutrophication of water ways."); see also NPDES
Regulations for Revision of the Water Pollution Control Program Addressing Storm Water
Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. at 68,728-29 ("Large inputs of coarse sediment into stream channels
initially will reduce stream depth and minimize habitat complexity by filling in pools.").
26 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(15)(i) (2006). See Effiuent Limitations Guidelines and Standards
for the Construction and Development Point Source Category 73 Fed. Reg. 72,562, 72,571
(proposed Nov. 28, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 450) ("Typically, construction activities
involve clearing the land of vegetation, digging, earth moving and grading, followed by the active
construction period when the affected land is usually left denuded and the soil compacted, often
leading to an increase in the peak discharge rate and the total volume of storm water discharged and
higher rates to erosion .... Where the soil surface is unprotected, soil and sand particles may be
easily picked up by wind and/or washed away by rain or snow melt."); see also National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System Permit (NPDES) Application Regulations for Storm Water
Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990, 47,992 (Nov. 16, 1990) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(c)(l)(iii)
(2006» ("Even a small amount of construction may have a significant negative impact on water
quality in localized areas.").
27 See Effiuent Limitations Guidelines and Standards, 73 Fed. Reg. at 72,565. The EPA
requires that a discharger develop and implement a storm water pollution prevention plan that
describes what control measures the discharger will be implementing to minimize discharges from
the construction sites. In addition, the EPA requires dischargers to monitor, inspect and report
releases of hazardous substances. [d.
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2. Oil and Gas Exploration and Production

Congress recognized that oil and gas operators expended resources
toward implementing best management practices on their sites to
minimize pollutant discharges?8 Therefore, Congress did not want to
burden oil and gas operators with a permit requirement. 29 Congress also
saw a potential drain on the EPA's staff resources if the EPA were
required to permit all oil and gas operators. 30 In consideration of these
two factors, Congress allowed the EPA to create a NPDES permit
exemption for uncontaminated storm water runoff from oil and gas
operations. 3!
The EPA outlined when a discharge from an oil or gas operation
would be considered a "contaminant" that triggered the NPDES permit
requirement. 32 The exemption stated that the Administrator would not
require a permit for storm water discharges from oil and gas exploration
and production sites that "are not contaminated by contact with any
overburden, raw material, intermediate products, finished product,
byproduct or waste products located on the site of such operations.,,33
28 NPDES Pennit Application Regulations for Stonn Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. at
48,029 ("Congress also recognized that there are numerous situations in the mining and oil and gas
industries where stonn water is channeled around plants and operations through a series of ditches
and other structural devices in order to prevent pollution of the stonn water by hannful
contaminants. From the standpoint of resource drain on both EPA as the permitting agency and
potential pennit applicants, the conclusion was that operators that use good management practices
and make expenditures to prevent contamination must not be burdened with the requirement to
obtain a permit."); see also id. at 48,034 ("Techniques to prevent or control pollutants in storm water
discharges from construction are well developed and understood. A primary control technique is
good site planning. A combination of nonstructural and structural best management practices are
typically used on construction sites. Relatively inexpensive non-structural vegetative controls, such
as seeding and mulching, are effective control techniques. In some cases, more expensive structural
controls may be necessary, such as detention basins or diversions.").
29 [d. at 48029 ("From the standpoint of resource drain on both EPA as the pennitting agency
and potential permit applicants, the conclusion was that operators that use good management
practices and make expenditures to prevent contamination must not be burdened with the
requirement to obtain a permit.").
30 [d.

31 [d. ("[S]ection 402(1)(2) creates a statutory exemption from storm water permitting
requirements for uncontaminated runoff from these facilities .... Storm water discharges that are not
contaminated by contact with any overburden, raw material, intermediate products, finished product,
byproduct or waste products located on the site of such operations will not be required to obtain a
storm water discharge permit.").
32
40 C.F.R. § 122.26(c)(I)(iv) (2006) ("The operator of an existing or new discharge
composed entirely of stonn water from a mining operation is not required to submit a pennit
application unless the discharge has come into contact with, any overburden, raw material,
intermediate products, finished product, byproduct or waste products located on the site of such
operations.").
33 33 V.S.C.A. § 1342(1)(2) (Westlaw 2009).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2009

7

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 3

308

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

The EPA required an NPDES pennit when an oil and gas operation
either released a reportable quantity of oil or hazardous substances in
storm water or if the discharge "contribute[d] to a violation of a water
quality standard. ,,34
The exemption was limited to oil and gas operation activities, while
oil and gas construction sites were required to obtain an NPDES
permit. 35 However, the EPA discovered that this permit requirement
would impact up to 30,000 oil and gas construction sites, which was
more than the EPA intended to cover.36 The EPA found that the permit
requirement would have a significant economic impact on these sites and
wanted to evaluate the magnitude of impact. 37 Consequently, the EPA
did not require oil and gas construction sites disturbing one or more acres
to obtain a permit until it completed its impact study.38
B. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION UNDER THE CHEVRON
DEFERENCE TEST
The Administrative Procedure Act ("AP A") established the
framework for judicial review of agency actions. 39 The APA states, in
34 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(c}(I}(iii} (2006) ("The operator of an existing or new discharge
composed entirely of storm water from an oil or gas exploration, production, processing, or
treatment operation, or transmission facility is not required to submit a permit application in
accordance with paragraph (c}(I}(i) of this section, unless the facility: (A) Has had a discharge of
storm water resulting in the discharge of a reportable quantity for which notification is or was
required pursuant to 40 CFR 117.21 or 40 CFR 302.6 at anytime since November 16, 1987; or (8)
Has had a discharge of storm water resulting in the discharge of a reportable quantity for which
notification is or was required pursuant to 40 CFR 110.6 at any time since November 16, 1987; or
(C) Contributes to a violation of a water quality standard.").
3S Natural Res. Oef. Council v. EPA (NRDC 2008), 526 F.3d 591, 597 (9th Cir. 2008); see 33
V.S.C.A. § 1362(24} (Westlaw 2008) ("The term 'oil and gas exploration, production, processing, or
treatment operations or transmission facilities' means all field activities or operations associated with
exploration, production, processing, or treatment operations, or transmission facilities, including
activities necessary to prepare a site for drilling and for the movement and placement of drilling
equipment, whether or not such field activities or operations may be considered to be construction
activities."); see also V.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, INDUSTRIAL STORMWATER
FACT SHEET SERIES, SECTOR I: OIL AND GAS EXTRACTION FACILITIES (2006), available at
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubslsector_i_oilgas.pdf (Construction activities at an oil and gas facility
include installing access roads, drill pads, mud/reserve pits, personnel quarters, surface
impoundments, storage tanks, and pipelines.).
36 NRDC 2008,526 F.3d at 598 n.IO (noting the EPA's initial assumption that only a few oil
and gas construction sites would be affected by the permit requirement on the presumption that most
of these sites disturbed less than one acre).
37 [d. at 598.
38 [d. (The EPA deferred the application of the permit requirement to oil and gas construction
sites for a total of three years and three months in order to collect information about oil and gas
construction sites and analyze the economic impact the permit requirement had on these activities.).
39 5 V.S.C.A. § 706 (Westlaw 2009).
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part, that
[t]he reviewing court shall- hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be- (A) arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or
immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right; [or] (0) without observance of
procedure required by law ....'10

To detenmne if an agency's action is arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion, the United States Supreme Court established what is
referred to as the Chevron deference test in 1984 when it decided
Chevron US.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. 41 In step
one, a court must look at the plain language of the statute and the
legislative history to see if Congress unambiguously expressed its clear
intent as to how the statute is to be interpreted by the administrating
agency.42 If the court finds that Congress has not clearly addressed the
specific issue in question within the statute, it analyzes the agency's
interpretation under step two. 43
In Chevron step two, the court looks at whether the administrating
agency's interpretation was a permissible one under the statute. 44 The
court cannot substitute its own interpretation of the statute. 4S Rather, the
court must determine whether the agency's statutory interpretation was
reasonable, within its authority provided by Congress, and not contrary

5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A)-(D) (Westlaw 2009).
Kristen E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search o/the Modern Skidmore Standard,
107 COLUM. L. REv. 1235, 1236-37 (2007). This article describes the first deference test the U.S.
Supreme Court established in 1944 in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). The Skidmore
test provided that deference to an administrator would "depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." 323 U.S. at 140.
The Court further stated that each statutory interpretation case must stand on its own facts, thereby
allowing the court to be in a position to interpret the statute for the case at bar as opposed to
deferring to the administrator's interpretation. Id.
42 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) ("First,
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.").
43 Id. at 843 ("[I)f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.").
44 Id.
40
41

45 Id. ("[T)he court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.").
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to congressional goals for the statute. 46 If the court finds that an
agency's statutory interpretation satisfies either step of the Chevron
deference test, the court will defer to the agency's interpretation.47
The Supreme Court recognized that there were times when
The Court
Congress purposely writes an ambiguous statute.48
understood that Congress intended for the administrating agency, which
Congress designated as the administrator of the statute, to fill the gap
between the ambiguous statute and the congressional goals of the
statute. 49 Simply put, the agency's interpretation is given controlling
weight unless found to be arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to
the congressional intent of the statute. 50
The Supreme Court asserted that an agency interpretation of a
relevant provision that conflicts with the agency's earlier interpretation is
entitled to considerably less deference than a consistently held agency
view. 51 Yet the Supreme Court recognized that "the mere fact that an
agency interpretation contradicts a prior position is not fatal.,,52 The
agency must justify its change in position with reasoned analysis. 53 A
court cannot reasonably find that an agency has acted within its
delegated powers if that agency's assertions lack support. 54 Additionally,
failing to provide an implementable permitting scheme to verify
compliance provides support for an argument that an agency's action is

46 1d. at 845 ("If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies
that were committed to the agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears
from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation [was] not one that Congress would
have sanctioned.") (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961)).
47 See id. at 843-44 (presenting the two step deference test).
48 1d. at 843-44 ("If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency
on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its
own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator
of an agency.").
49
1d.
50 Id. at 844.
51 Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 2008), 526 F.3d 591, 605 (9th Cir. 2008)
(quoting I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447 (1987)).
52 Id. at 608 (Callahan, J., dissenting)(quoting Smiley v. Citibank 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996)).
53 Id. at 609 (Callahan, 1., dissenting) ("Courts will accord Chevron deference to an agency's
revised interpretation ofa statute if the agency justifies that revision with 'reasoned analysis."').
54 See. e.g.. Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 1992), 966 F.2d 1292, 1305 (9th CiT.
1992) (stating, in the context of review of the EPA's permit exemption for light industries, which
was not extended to the entire industry class, that "[ w]ithout supportable facts, we are unable to rely
on our usual assumption that the EPA has rationally exercised the duties delegated to it by
Congress").
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arbitrary and capricious. 55
Although Congress gives an administrating agency discretion to use
its expertise in interpreting and implementing a statute, this is not a
license for the agency to treat similar cases differently.56 The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia explained that
[a]n agency cannot meet the arbitrary and capricious test by treating
type A cases differently from similarly situated type B cases. . .. The
treatment of cases A and B, where the two cases are functionally
indistinguishable, must be consistent. That is the very meaning of the
arbitrary and capricious standard. 57

Therefore, when an agency fails to evenhandedly apply a
requirement in two cases that are "functionally indistinguishable," the
agency's actions are deemed arbitrary and capricious. 58
II. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

In NRDC v. EPA, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the EPA's
permit exemption for oil and gas construction sites that had sedimentonly discharges was in violation the CWA.59 The court held that the
EPA's creation of the permit exemptions was arbitrary and capricious
because the exemptions were a "complete departure" from the EPA's
long-standing position that oil and gas construction site sediment was a
55 See id. The court stated that the EPA's proposed exemption should have required a light
industry self-report in order to demonstrate that its facility did not have "actual exposure" to storm
water and would not require a permit to discharge. Alternatively, the EPA would have to physically
go to light industrial sites to verify that these sites were indeed exempt from the permit requirements.
However, the Ninth Circuit found that the proposed regulation failed to contemplate the likelihood
that either the light industry would self-report or that the EPA would physically verify compliance.
This further supported the Ninth Circuit's decision that the EPA's proposed exemption for light
industry was arbitrary and capricious. Id.
56 See United States v. Diapulse Corp. of Am., 748 F.2d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 1984) (rejecting the
Food and Drug Administration's refusal to allow the marketing of Diapulse's medical device while
allowing the marketing of another company's device that was roughly identical to Diapulse's device,
and insisting that the Food and Drug Administration apply the same legal standards to Diapulse
afforded to Diapulse's competitors); see also Distrigas of Mass. Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, F.2d
761,765-66 (1st Cir. 1975) ("While the Agency has broad powers to regulate, and in so doing to
choose between rulernaking and individual decisional processes, it also has a duty to define and
apply its polices in a minimally responsible and evenhanded way.").
57lndep. Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
58

[d.

59 Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 2008), 526 F.3d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 2008)
(NRDC challenged the permit exemption as an unlawful interpretation of the amended section
402(1)(2) of the CWA.).
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contaminant that must be regulated. 60
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The EPA was in the midst of assessing the economic impact of the
NPDES permit requirement on oil and gas construction activities when
Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act in 2005. 61 The Energy Policy
Act represents a comprehensive national energy policy that addresses
every form of energy.62 The goal of the Act was to "encourage energy
efficiency and conservation, promote alternative and renewable energy
sources, reduce our dependence on foreign sources of energy, and
increase domestic production.,,63 With regard to oil and gas activities,
Congress sought to reduce impediments to domestic oil and gas
exploration and production. 64 As a result, Congress amended the
definition of oil and gas exploration and production in section 402(1)(2)
of the CWA to include construction activities. 65 Congress revised the
definition as follows:
The tenn "oil and gas exploration, production, processing, or
treatment operations or transmission facilities" means all field
activities or operations associated with exploration, production,
Id. at 607.
Id. at 598 (The EPA postponed the application of the NPDES pennit requirements to oil
and gas construction sites until June 12, 2006-three years and three months after the effective date
of the pennit requirement-in order to assess the economic impact the pennit requirement would
have on these sites); see Energy Policy Act of2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
62 Legislation Committee, Committee Report, 27 ENERGY L.J. 349, 349 (2006) (providing a
brief summary of each Title contained in the Energy Policy Act).
63 U.S. Department of the Interior,lmplementing the Energy Policy Act at the Department of
the Interior, http://www.doi.gov/iepai (last visited Dec. 9, 2008) (stating that the Department of the
Interior will playa major role in meeting the goals and objectives of the Energy Policy Act because
eighty-six sections of the Energy Policy Act require the Department of the Interior to take action).
64 See Legislation Committee, Committee Report, 27 ENERGY LJ. 349, 353 (2006)
("Similarly, Section 323 of EPAct of 2005 changes the definition of oil and gas exploration and
production in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, also removing an impediment to exploration
and production of natural gas. EPAct 2005 also creates a royalty-in-kind program, which would
pennit the Department of the Interior to receive royalties for production of natural gas on federal
lands in kind rather than in cash. This important provision should make major strides in reducing the
disputes between natural gas producers and the federal government with regard to the valuation of
natural gas produced on federal lands. Over time this program, once implemented, should reduce the
recurrent litigation between producers and the government."); see also Modification of National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Pennit Deadline for Stonn Water Discharges for
Oil and Gas Construction Activity That Disturbs One to Five Acres of Land, 67 Fed. Reg. 79,828,
79,829 (Dec. 30, 2002) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122 (Westlaw 2009» (detennining that
approximately 30,000 oil and gas construction sites were required to obtain NPDES pennits and that
the compliance cost would range from $1,206 to $8,709).
65 33 U.S.C § 1362(24) (Westlaw 2008); NRDC 2008,526 F.3d at 599.
60

61
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processing, or treatment operations, or transmission facilities,
including activities necessary to prepare a site for drilling and for the
movement and placement of drilling equipment, whether or not such
field activities or operations may be considered to be construction
activities. 66

The EPA codified stonn water pennit exemptions for oil and gas
operations based upon the original definition in section 402(1)(2) of the
CWA, which did not include construction activities. 67 Although the
stonn water pennit exemption language remained unchanged by the
Energy Policy Act, the EPA reevaluated this exemption in light of the
amended definition of oil and gas exploration and production. 68
In June 2006, the EPA published the pennit exemption amending
the NPDES pennit requirements for oil and gas construction sites. 69 The
pennit exemption provided that oil and gas construction activities were
eligible for NPDES pennit exemptions if those activities resulted in
sediment-only discharges, even if there was a water quality violation. 70
The EPA reasoned that sediment alone was not necessarily indicative of
"contamination through contact with raw material, intennediate products,
finished product, byproduct or waste products.,,7l The EPA further
stated that if sediment came in contact with any of these named
materials, with a result of either reportable quantities requiring
notification or a water quality standard violation for a pollutant other
than sediment, the EPA would require an NPDES pennit.72
33 V.S.C § 1362(24) (Westlaw 2008) (emphasis added).
40 C.F.R. § I 22.26(c)(1)(iii) (2006) (providing NPDES permit requirement triggers for oil
and gas exploration facilities).
68 NRDC 2008,526 FJd at 599 ("In January 2006, [the) EPA gave notice of proposed rulemaking that would modify [the) EPA's NPDES storm water permit regulations to reflect the Energy
Policy Act's change to the definition of oil and gas operations and facilities and the related impact
on section 402(1)(2).").
69 [d. at 600 ("In June 2006, EPA promulgated the challenged final rule-entitled
'Amendments to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Regulations for
Storm Water Discharges Associated With Oil and Gas Exploration, Production, Processing, or
Treatment Operations or Transmission Facilities'--<:odifying changes to the CWA resulting from
.
the Energy Policy Act of2005.").
70 [d. ("[The) EPA cannot require permits for storm water discharges comprised solely of
sediment from oil and gas construction activities, even if such discharges contribute to a violation of
a water quality standard.").
71 [d. (quoting Amendments to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) Regulations for Storm Water Discharges Associated With Oil and Gas Exploration,
Production, Processing, or Treatment Operations or Transmission Facilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 33,628,
33,361 (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(a)(2)(ii».
72 Amendments to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
Regulations for Storm Water Discharges Associated With Oil and Gas Exploration, Production,.
Processing, or Treatment Operations or Transmission Facilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 33,628, 33,634 (June
66

67
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The NRDC, along with the Oil and Gas Accountability Project,
Amigos Bravos, and Powder River Basin Resource Council, challenged
the EPA's permit exemption as an impermissible interpretation of section
402(1)(2).73 The Ninth Circuit granted review under its authority for
appellate review of the EPA rules governing the underlying procedures. 74
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION
A panel of the Ninth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, held that the EPA's
statutory interpretation of section 402(1)(2), as amended by the Energy
Policy Act of 2005, was arbitrary and capricious because of the EPA's
change in position regarding what constitutes a "contaminant" in relation
to oil and gas activities. 75 The majority vacated the EPA's rule and
remanded the matter back to the agency for further proceedings
consistent with the court's opinion. 76 The dissent, however, stated that
the EPA acted within its authority when it reassessed the permit
exemption in light of Congress's intent to provide more exemptions for
oil and gas activities to meet the goals of the Energy Policy Act. 77
1. Majority
The Ninth Circuit maJonty used the Chevron deference test to
determine whether to give deference to the EPA's NPDES permit
exemption for oil and gas construction activities. 78 In Chevron step one,
the court evaluated whether Congress expressly intended to exempt oil
and gas construction activities from NPDES permitting when such
activities discharged only sediment. 79

12, 2006) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(c)(I)(iii) (2006» ("Sediment could, however, serve as a
vehicle for discharges of other pollutants, such as oil or grease or hazardous substances (e.g., heavy
metals) and if a [reportable quantity] is exceeded or a water quality standard violated for such other
pollutants, such contamination would trigger permitting requirements.").
73 NRDC 2008,526 F.3d at 601.
74/d.

ld. at 607-08 (asserting that the permit exemption was inconsistent and in conflict with the
EPA's long-standing position on sediment-laden storm water).
76 ld. at 608.
77 ld. at 611 (Callahan, J., dissenting) ("Not only was EPA's interpretation in flux at the time
it promulgated the storm water discharge rule, but it was guided by its interpretation of Congress's
intent in the Energy Policy Act to provide greater exemptions with regard to the discharge of
sediment from oil and gas construction activities.").
78 1d. at 602 (stating the Ninth Circuit's standard of review).
79 1d. at 526 F.3d at 603 ("First, we must determine whether Congress ... unambiguously
intended to exempt from NPDES permitting requirements for oil and gas construction activities the
discharge of storm water runoff contaminated solely with sediment.").
7S
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The EPA argued that it was Congress's intent to allow such
exemptions for oil and gas construction activities. 80 In support of its
contention, the EPA referred to statements made by members of
Congress who had opposed the amendment to section 402(1)(2) of the
The EPA specifically relied on Senator Jim Jeffords's
CWA. 81
explanation that storm water discharges typically contained "pollutants
such as oil and grease, chemicals, nutrients, metals, bacteria, and
particulates. ,,82 The EPA stated that the senator's description was
synonymous with sediment. 83 The EPA argued that the opposition's
statements confirmed Congress's intent to exempt storm water
discharges from oil and gas related construction activities, regardless of
sediment's impact on water quality.84 The court was not persuaded by
this argument and noted that statements made by opponents, like Senator
Jeffords, were not authoritative. 85
The court found that the plain language of section 402(1)(2) did not
expressly state that exempting sediment-only discharges was Congress's
intent. 86 In addition, the court stated that Congress did not explicitly
mention the word "sediment" in the amended definition of oil and gas
exploration and production. 87 Furthermore, there was limited legislative
history on this section, which did not specifically address whether
"sediment" discharges should be exempt from permit requirements. 88 As
a result, the court found that Congress was silent on the issue of
exempting sediment-only discharges from oil and gas construction

80

!d. at 604 (referring to the legislative history of the amendment to section 402(1)(2) of the

CWA).
81 [d. (stating that the EPA noted that one of the reasons the opponents of the Energy Policy
Act voted against it was because it exempted from CW A regulations the storm water discharges
from oil and gas construction sites).
82 [d.; see also lSI CONGo REc. S9335-01, S9349 (daily ed. July 29, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Jeffords). Senator Jeffords of Vermont opposed § 323 of the Energy Policy Act, stating that this
section "changes how the Environmental Protection Agency is able to regulate oil and gas
construction activities under the Phase I and Phase" of the Clean Water Act Storm water Program."
Further, Senator Jeffords stated that exempting oil and gas construction activities from storm water
permitting would negatively impact water quality and biological resources in our nation's waters.
Finally, Senator Jeffords recommended that the EPA should continue to require discharge permits to
oil and gas construction sites consistent with requirements for other types of construction activities.
83 NRDC 2008,526 F.3d at 604.
84 [d.

8S [d. at 605 ("[S]tatements by opponents are among the least authoritative, as they are meant
to defeat the bill in question and do not 'represent the considered and collective understanding of
those Congressmen' who passed the bill into law.").
86 [d. at 603 (stating that section 402(1)(2) did not specifically mention the term "sediment").
87 [d. at 608.
88 [d. at 604.
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activities from pennit requirements. 89 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that Chevron step one was not satisfied. 9o
The court then proceeded to step two of the Chevron deference test,
analyzing the EPA's statutory interpretation to determine whether it was
a pennissible reading of the statute. 91 The EPA argued that because
sediment was most commonly associated with construction site
discharges, Congress must have intended to exempt construction-related
sediment. 92 The EPA argued that if this were not the case, the
amendment would be meaningless. 93 However, the EPA conceded that it
had not considered exempting sediment-only discharges from NPDES
permit requirements prior to the Energy Policy Act of 2005. 94 Moreover,
the agency admitted that it previously required storm water permits for
sediment discharges that violated water quality limitations even if the
sediment was uncontaminated. 95 Lastly, the EPA argued that requiring
pennits for sediment discharges was a "rule of administrative
convenience" because it had presumed that sediment runoff from oil and
gas construction sites likely came in contact with pollutants. 96
The court found the EPA's arguments "unpersuasive in light of
EPA's own statements during its rule-making process prior to the
passage of the Energy Policy Act.,,97 The court's finding was based upon
the agency's long-standing position that oil and gas construction sites
were prime candidates for storm water pennitting because of the serious
water quality impacts associated with the sediment-laden discharges. 98
In addition, the court used the EPA's past findings that construction
activities resulted in greater sediment runoff than agriculture and
89 NRDC 2008,526 F.3d at 605 ("Because we conclude that Congress was silent on the issue,
we move to Chevron step two.").
90 [d. at 605 ("Because we conclude that Congress was silent on the issue, we move to
Chevron step two.").

91

[d.

[d. at 605-06 (The EPA reasoned that because Congress broadened the eXlstmg
exemptions in section 402(1)(2) for construction sites, it "believe[d] that discharges of sediment
[were] not necessarily indicative of such contact [with raw material, intermediate products, finished
product, byproduct or waste products].").
93 [d. at 606.
94 [d. ("[The] EPA concedes that, prior to the Energy Policy Act amendment to the CWA, if
a gas and oil facility discharged storm water runoff contaminated only with sediment resulting in a
water quality violation, that facility did not meet the conditions for permit exemption under 402(1
)(2) and thus was required to apply for a permit.").
95 [d. at 606.
96 [d. at 607 (indicating that the pollutants of concern at an oil and gas construction site
include overburden, raw material, intermediate products, finished product, byproduct, or waste
products).
97 !d.
92

98

[d.
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forestlands as additional support for its conclusion. 99 The court also
disagreed with the EPA's statement that this was a rule of mere
administrative convenience because of the EPA's prior statements about
sediment. loo Finally, the court found that because of the agency's longstanding concern over sediment-laden storm water discharges, and
studies supporting its concerns, the EPA was compelled to regulate
sediment discharges under the CWA.101
As a result, the court found that the EPA's statutory interpretation of
section 402(1)(2) represented a "complete departure" from what the EPA
considered to be a contaminant from oil and gas construction sites. I02
Therefore, the court held that the EPA's statutory interpretation of
section 402(1)(2), as amended by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, was
arbitrary and capricious. 103
2. Dissent

Circuit Judge Consuelo Callahan dissented. Judge Callahan agreed
that Congress did not expressly state its intent to exempt sediment-only
discharges from NPDES permitting in either the plain language of
section 402(1)(2) or its legislative history.l04 The dissent also agreed that
the validity of the EPA's permit exemption depended on the result of the
second step of the Chevron deference test. 105 However, the dissent
asserted that the majority's analysis under step two was incorrect. 106
The dissent rejected the majority's reasoning that the EPA's permit
exemption was arbitrary and capricious simply because the EPA had a
long-standing position that sediment discharges that violated water
quality standards required an NPDES permit. 107 Judge Callahan stated
that
99 [d. ("[S]ediment runoff rates from construction sites are typically IO to 20 times that of
agricultural lands ... [and] 1,000 to 2,000 times that offorest lands.").
100 [d. ("In light of [the] EPA's prior statements, it can hardly be said that EPA's previous
stance was merely a 'rule of administrative convenience' or that [the] EPA never considered how
sediment alone should be treated prior to the Energy Policy Act of 2005.").
101 [d. at 607.
102 [d.
103 [d.
104 [d. at 608 (Callahan, 1., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority's analysis under step one of
the Chevron deference test).
105 [d. (Callahan, 1., dissenting) ("[A]s the majority correctly concludes, this dispute must be
resolved at step two of the Chevron analysis.").
106 [d. (Callahan, 1., dissenting) ("I respectfully part course with the majority and accord [the]
EPA's permissible interpretation appropriate deference.").
107 [d. at 610 (Callahan, 1., dissenting) (stating reasons the majority's conclusions were
incorrect).
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there appears to be no authority that would compel [the] EPA to stay
its hand until Congress specifically amended the ambiguous
exemption at section 402(1)(2) to include the word "sediment."
Second, the mere fact that [the] EPA revisited the exemption after
passage of the Energy Policy Act does not render the results of its
. arb'Itrary. 108
anaIYSls
The dissent went on to explain that prior to the passage of the
Energy Policy Act, the EPA had not committed to a rigid position
regarding sediment discharges related to oil and gas construction sites. 109
The dissent opined that the EPA acted within its authority when
revisiting its statutory interpretation of section 402(1)(2) of the CW A. IIO
The dissent concluded that the EPA's interpretation was at least as
plausible as competing ones and the court should have deferred to the
agency's interpretation of section 402(1)(2) of the CWA as amended by
the Energy Policy ACt. 111
III. THE EPA'S INTERPRETATION OF CWA SECTION 402(L)(2)
WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS BECAUSE IT WAS A
COMPLETE DEPARTURE FROM THE EPA'S LONGSTANDING POSITION THAT SEDIMENT DISCHARGES
MUST BE REGULATED
The Ninth Circuit panel based its decision on the fact that the permit
exemption was a complete departure from the EPA's long-standing
position that sediment was a contaminant that invoked the NPDES
permit requirement. 1I2 The court's decision was correct because
sediment is a pollutant under the CWA; therefore, the EPA is compelled
to regulate sediment discharges through NPDES permits. l13 The permit
exemption would have allowed sediment discharges from an oil and gas
construction site to go unregulated, which would have gone against the
CWA provision that prohibits discharge of pollutants without a permit. 114
(Callahan, J., dissenting).
(Callahan, J., dissenting).
at 610-11 (Callahan, J., dissenting).
at 611 (Callahan, J., dissenting).
at 607 (majority opinion).
113 See Effluent Limitation Guidelines and Standards for the Construction and Development
Point Source Category, 73 Fed. Reg. 72,562, 72,571 (proposed Nov. 28, 2008) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pI. 450) (uThe most prominent and most widespread pollutant discharged from [construction
and development) sites is sediment."); see also NRDC 2008, 526 F.3d at 607 (stating that the court
recognized the EPA's reports and studies supporting the fact that construction site discharges
contribute a significant amount of pollutants that the EPA was compelled to regulate).
114
33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(a) (Westlaw 2008) (U[T)he Administrator may ... issue a permit for
108 [d.
9

/d.
110 [d.
III [d.
112 [d.

\0
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A. THE PERMIT EXEMPTION CONTRAVENED THE GOALS OF
THECWA
The EPA's pennit exemption must comport with the CWA's
overarching goal. 115 For instance, in American Mining Congress v. EPA,
the Ninth Circuit reviewed the EPA's regulation that required storm
water discharge permits for inactive mining operations. 116 The plaintiffs
argued that the language in the statute clearly regulated only discharges
from industrial activity.1I7 Since inactive mines were no longer active
industrial sites, the plaintiffs asserted that a discharge pennit was not
required. I 18 However, the statute stated that permits were required for
"discharge[s] associated with industrial activity.,,119 The EPA argued
that discharges from past mining activities were associated with
industrial activityl20 and noted that some inactive mining sites still
represented a significant source of contamination that required
regulating. 121
The Ninth Circuit found that it was reasonable for the EPA to
require discharge permits for inactive mining operations. 122 The court
found the EPA's decision stemmed from the undisputed fact that there
was ongoing contamination from these sites. 123 The court went on say
that the EPA further limited the scope of regulation of inactive mines to
sites where discharges likely became contaminated through association

discharge of a pollutant."); see 33 U.S.C.A. § l251(a) (Westlaw 2008).
115 See 33 V.S.C.A. § l251(d) (Westlaw 2008). Congress named the EPA the Administrator
of the CW A. As such, the EPA is charged with implementing the CW A in accordance with the
stated congressional goal of the CW A "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the nation's waters." /d.
116 Am. Mining Congo V. EPA, 965 F.2d 759, 764 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Section 402(p)(2)(8) of
the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2)(8), authorizes [the] EPA to require a permit for any storm water
discharge 'associated with industrial activity.' AMC contends that [the] EPA's regulation of
discharges from inactive mines under this section contravenes Congress' intent.").
117/d.
118/d. (explaining that the plain language of the statute regulated "industrial activity" and that
since there was no "activity" at an inactive mine, the statute would not apply).
119 [d. (emphasis added).
120 [d. (explaining that "past industrial activity ... including mines, may be 'associated with'
that industrial activity, and referencing 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14), which defines "discharge
associated with industrial activity" as discharges from "areas where significant industrial activity has
taken place in the past and significant materials remain and are exposed to storm water").
121 /d. at 765.
122 See id. at 765 ("We conclude that [the] EPA's regulation meets the reasonableness
standard. ").
123 See id. (referencing the EPA's statement that mining sites represented a significant source
of contaminated storm water runoff, which was well documented and was an assertion that AMC did
not challenge).
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with industrial activity.124 Finally, the court held that the EPA's
interpretation was consistent with the overall goals of the CW A because
Congress intended to give the EPA authority to adopt an orderly
permitting process to address the major contributors of pollutants. 125
In NRDC v. EPA, unlike in American Mining Congress, the permit
exemption for oil and gas construction sites was contrary to the overall
goals of the CWA. As the Ninth Circuit acknowledged, the EPA had a
long-standing position that sediment was a pollutant under the CWA and
was compelled to regulate it. 126 When the EPA promulgated its
regulations for construction site discharges, it stressed the harm to the
waterways that results from these types of discharges. 127 The EPA has
even provided data demonstrating the amount of sediment deposited into
streams from construction activity as compared to other types of land
uses. 128 Based on scientific data and studies, the EPA concluded that
construction site discharges must be regulated through NPDES
permits. 129
Even though the EPA knew (and previously admitted) this area
needed regulation, it likely created a new exemption for oil and gas
construction sites to meet Congress's goal for the Energy Policy ACt. 130
One of the goals of this Act was to increase domestic production of
energy supplies in order to decrease the nation's dependence on foreign
supplies. 131 A way to meet this goal is to relieve the energy producers
124
125

!d. at 765-66.
[d. at 766.

Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 2008),526 F.3d 591, 607 (9th Cir. 2008).
See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Application Regulations for
Storm Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990, 47,992 (Nov. 16, 1990) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts.
122-124 (Westlaw 2009» (stating that "[elven a small amount of construction may have a significant
negative impact on water quality in localized areas").
128 See id. With regard to construction site sediment, the EPA has stated that construction sites
contribute "10 to 20 times that of agricultural lands" and "1,000 to 2,000 times that of forest lands."
126

127

[d.
129 See id. at 48,033-34 ("EPA is convinced that because of the impacts of construction
discharges that are directly to waters of the United States, such discharges should be addressed by
permits issued by Federal or NPDES State permitting authorities. It is evident from numerous
studies and reports submitted under section 319 of the CW A that discharges from construction sites
continue to be a major source of water quality problems and water quality standard violations.
Accordingly EPA is compelled to address these source[ slunder these regulations and thereby
regulate these sources under a nationally consistent program with an appropriate level of
enforcement and oversight.").
130 See Legislation Committee, Committee Report, 27 ENERGY L.1. 349, 353 (2006)
("Similarly, Section 323 of EPAct of 2005 changes the definition of oil and gas exploration and
production in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, also removing an impediment to exploration
and production of natural gas.").
131 Justin Stole, The Energy Policy Act of 2005: The Path to Energy Autonomy, 33 J. LEGIS.
119, 128 (2006) ("[Tlhe long-awaited Act includes provisions that aim to '[ dlecrease ... America's
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from certain environmental compliance requirements placed on their
construction sites. For example, in order to reduce impediments to oil
and gas production, Congress revised the definition for oil and gas
exploration and production in the CWA to include construction sites. 132
Congress did this in order to extend the existing exemptions for oil and
gas operations to oil and gas construction sites. 133 However, Congress
did not authorize the EPA to allow pollutants to go unregulated in order
to meet the goals of the Energy Policy ACt. 134
By allowing an oil and gas construction site to discharge sediment
without a permit, the EPA would in effect authorize discharges of a
known pollutant. The existing permit exemption for oil and gas
operations did not include exemptions for sediment-only discharges. 135
Rather, the EPA created a new exemption in order to make it feasible for
oil and gas construction sites to be exempt from storm water permit
requirements. 136 Yet the EPA failed to refute its own statements that
sediment was a contaminant under the CWA and must be regulated. 137
The EPA also did not offer supporting evidence that sediment, alone,

dangerous dependence' on Middle Eastern oil, promote new 'nuclear and hydropower production,'
and supply 'leadership in energy conservation."').
132 See Legislation Committee, Committee Report, 27 ENERGY L.J. 349, 353 (2006).
133 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 2008), 526 F.3d 591, 603 (9th Cir. 2008)
("The plain language of section 402(1 )(2) of the CW A, as affected by the Energy Policy Act, does
not indicate whether or not Congress intended that the NPDES permit exemption cover storm water
discharges contaminated solely with sediment. Neither CW A section 402(1 )(2) nor section 323 of
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 mention the term 'sediment.' The statutory language of section
402(1)(2) merely indicates that oil and gas operations or facilities, which now include construction
activities, are exempt from NPDES permitting requirements so long as the storm water runoff from
those activities is not contaminated with, or does not come in contact with, certain statutorily
undefined contaminants: overburden, raw material, intermediate products, finished product,
byproduct, or waste products.").
134 See 33 V.S.C.A. § 1362(24) (Westlaw 2008) Congress amended the definition of oil and
gas exploration and production to include construction activities. No additional guidance was
provided by Congress in either the amended section of the CWA or the legislative history of the
Energy Policy Act; see also NRDC 2008, 526 F.3d at 608 ("[T]he statutory exemption (402(1)(2))
[did not] make any mention at all of 'sediment' -or of whether it was covered or not.").
I35 See NRDC 2008,526 F.3d at 603 (explaining that Congress did not expressly mention the
word sediment when amending CW A section 402(1)(2) or section 323 of the Energy Policy Act of
2005, and that the existing exemption for oil and gas exploration and production facilities does not
mention the word "sediment").
136 See id. at 606 ("Thus, EPA argues that, because 'sediment is the pollutant most commonly
associated with construction activities,' Congress must have meant to exempt all construction-related
sediment with it made construction activities eligible for the exemption, or else the amendment
would be effectively meaningless.").
137 See id. at 607 (explaining that the EPA's numerous reports and studies support the fact that
construction site discharges impact water quality and concluding that the EPA must regulate these
discharges).
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would not impact the nation's waters. 138 Creating exemptions for
construction site sediment would frustrate the objective of the CW A,
which includes the express prohibition of the discharge of any pollutant
without a permit. 139
B. THE PERMIT EXEMPTION LACKED A PERMITTING SCHEME
TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE CWA
The exemption was also arbitrary and capricious because the EPA
did not provide a permitting scheme to ensure an oil and gas construction
site would have fallen within the storm water permit exemption. 140
Without an adequate permitting scheme, the EPA cannot ensure that an
oil and gas company would apply for a permit if its construction site
sediment came into contact with contaminants typically found at these
sites. 141 This scenario is similar to the EPA's previously proposed
exemption from storm water permitting requirements for light industries
so long as there was no actual exposure to storm water. 142 In 1992, the
Ninth Circuit found that the EPA lacked an adequate permitting scheme
to ensure that a light industrial facility was not actually exposed to storm
water and exempt from permitting. 143 The court found the permit
exemption to be arbitrary and capricious, and noted that the only way
that the EPA would be assured that a light industry was exempt was if
the facility self-reported or if the EPA conducted its own inspections of
138 See id. ("EPA also argues that it never previously considered, until the 2005 amendment,
how sediment alone should be treated under existing regulations.").
139 See 33 V.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (Westlaw 2008) ("The objective of [the Clean Water Act] is to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."); see
also 33 V.S.C.A. § 131 1(a) (Westlaw 2008) ("Except as in compliance with this section and sections
1312,1316,1317,1328,1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person
shall be unlawful.").
140 Cf Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC /992), 966 F.2d 1292, 1305 (9th Cir. 1992).
The Ninth Circuit struck down an NPDES permit exemption for light industries. One of the reasons
included the lack of a permitting scheme that would ensure a light industry was within the permit
exemption. The court doubted that a light industrial facility would have self-reported to the EPA
that their facility was exempt. In addition, the court doubted that the EPA would verify whether a
light industrial facility was indeed exempt. Because there was no assurance that a light industrial
site would apply for a permit if there were actual exposure to storm water, the Ninth Circuit found
the permit exemption for light industries arbitrary and capricious. /d.
141 See generally 33 V.S.C.A. § 1342(/)(2) (Westlaw 2009) (identifying the contaminants
typically found at an oil and gas site).
142 NRDC /992, 966 F.2d at 1304-05 (holding that the permit exemption was arbitrary and
capricious because the EPA created the exemption without substantiated support for its assumptions
that light industrial facilities (i.e., facilities that are comparable to retail, commercial or service
industries such as manufacturers of pharmaceuticals, paints, varnishes, fabrics, paper board, jewelry,
and toys) typically occur indoors and that exposure to storm water would therefore be minimal).
143 /d. at 1305.
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these facilities. 144
Without a well-thought-out permitting scheme to ensure compliance
with a permit exemption, a potential loophole would be created that
would allow unlawful discharges to go unregulated. For example, in
Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. EPA, environmental groups challenged the
EPA's regulation of water pollutants from concentrated animal feeding
operations ("CAFO,,).145 One of the many challenges involved the storm
water permit exemption for agriculture storm water discharge,146 which
did not require storm water permits for any "precipitation-related
discharge of manure, litter, or any process washwater from land areas
under control of a CAFO" when the CAFO's methods were consistent
with nutrient management plans. 147 In other words, if a CAFO operator
properly managed the land application of manure, litter, or process
washwater, it would not be liable for rainwater that carried these
constituents off the site. 148 Therefore, the CAFO operator would be
exempt from permit requirements. 149
Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., argued that agricultural storm water
runoff from CAFO sites should be regulated because CAFO discharges
were a regulated point source under the CW A. 150 The Second Circuit
rejected this argument because agriculture storm water was explicitly
excluded from the definition of point source in the CW A. 151 The court
said that Congress's goal was not to hold a CAFO liable for discharges
that were caused by nature. 152 As a result, the court held that this
144 Id. (stating that the regulations did not contemplate how the EPA would ensure compliance
and finding it unlikely that the two options would be implemented by the EPA).
145 Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 497 (2d Cir. 2005) (challenging the
CAFO rule, the pennitting scheme, the types of discharges subject to regulation under the CAFO
rule, and the effiuent limitation guidelines in the CAFO rule).
146 1d. at 506.
147 Id. at 507.
148 1d. at 509 ("[W]here a CAFO has taken steps to ensure appropriate agricultural utilization
of the nutrients in manure, litter, and process wastewater, it should not be held accountable for any
discharged that is primarily the result of 'precipitation. "').
149 See id. at 507 ("[T]he Rule, like the Clean Water Act itself, carves out an exception where
the discharge in question is 'an agricultural storm water discharge,' [40 C.F.R. § 122.23(e)] a
category of discharges that the Act exempts from regulation .... ").
150 1d. ("[T]he Clean Water Act's definition of 'point source' requires regulation of all CAFO
discharges, notwithstanding the fact that agricultural stonn water discharges are otherwise deemed
exempt from regulation.").
151 1d. at 507 (pointing out that the Clean Water Act's definition of "point source" does not
include agricultural stonn water discharges).
152 Id. The court stated that it was reasonable to conclude that Congress, by excluding
agricultural stonn water discharges from the definition of the tenn "point source," affinned the
impropriety of imposing permit requirements when agriculture-related discharges were not a result
of the CAFO operator's doing but was a result of weather. In addition, the Second Circuit noted that

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2009

23

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 3

324

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

exception was a pennissible interpretation of the CWA. 153
One critic of the agricultural storm water exemption stated that this
exemption created a potential loophole for manure discharges because
the exemption lacked provisions for enforcement and monitoring by the
EPA. 154 This exemption put the onus on the CAPO to develop a
management plan for the land application of manure, litter, or washwater
such that discharges would be minimal. ISS However, there was "no
guarantee that a government agency would ever review [these plans).,,156
In effect, the EPA presumed that the CAPO would develop a
comprehensive management plan that would allow a CAPO to fall within
the agriculture storm water discharge exemption. IS? Without adequate
review of these plans and strict enforcement by the EPA, there is a
potential that unauthorized discharges will occur from CAPO sites. ISS
A similar loophole would be present with the oil and gas
construction site permit exemption. Unlike the storm water discharge
exemption for CAPO sites, however, the EPA did not require a
management plan to control sediment from coming in contact with the
known contaminants from an oil and gas construction site. 159 In addition,
the exemption did not include monitoring or reporting requirements to
ensure that only uncontaminated sediment was being discharged. 160 As a
result, a presumption was created that oil and gas companies would be
there was no legislative history that contradicts this assertion. Id.
153 Id. at 509.
154 Michael Steeves, The EPA's Proposed CAFO Regulations Fall Short of Ensuring the
Integrity of Our Nation's Waters, 22 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. 1. 367, 390 (2002) (asserting
that the CAFO rule had "inefficient reporting and monitoring requirements, and [that] the absence of
the permitting authority in the plan development process serves to weaken the effectiveness of the
regulations and opens the door to unregulated discharges through the agricultural storm water
exemption").
155 See id. at 390-91 (referencing the preamble to the CAFO regulation that states that CAFO
operators are "ultimately responsible for developing and implementing effective [Permit Nutrient
Plans]").
156 See id. at 391.
157 Id. (arguing that CAFO owners and operators are required to develop a plan to manage
nutrient application on their sites in order to qualify for the exemption, and recognizing that there is
no guarantee that such a plan would be reviewed by any government agency).
158 Id. at 390 ("[T]he absence of the permitting authority in the plan development process
serves to weaken the effectiveness of the regulations and opens the door to unregulated discharges
through the agricultural storm water exemption.").
159 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 2008), 526 F.3d 591, 600 (9th Cir. 2008).
The challenged part of the exemption in 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(a)(2)(ii) states: "Discharges of sediment
from construction activities associated with oil and gas exploration, production, processing, or
treatment operations or transmission facilities are not subject to the provision of paragraph
(c)(I)(iii)(C) of this section." 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(c)(I)(iii)(C) provides that a permit is required
when the discharge "[ c]ontributes to a violation of a water quality standard."
160 See NRDC 2008,526 F.3d at 600.
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forthcoming and seek a storm water permit if sediments at its
construction sites came into contact with contaminants. 161
Without strict enforcement, like providing an adequate permitting
scheme, there would be no incentive for the oil and gas companies to
monitor sediment discharges from their construction sites to ensure they
are within the exemption. 162 This would open the door to unauthorized
contaminated sediment discharges from these sites in violation of the
CWA. 163 Because sediment is a recognized pollutant, the EPA is
compelled to regulate it. l64 By opening the door to potential abuse by the
oil and gas companies, the EPA would not be appropriately regulating
pollutant discharges. This would be manifestly contrary to the EPA's
responsibility under the CWA to prohibit discharges of pollutants
without a permit. 165
IV. ALTHOUGH THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION WAS CORRECT,
THE COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE EPA'S ATTEMPT TO
CARVE OUT AN EXEMPTION FOR ONLY ONE SEGMENT OF
THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
Within the Chevron step two analysis, the Ninth Circuit failed to
address the EPA's attempt to carve out an exemption for one segment of
the construction industry that did not extend to other segments of the
construction industry. The EPA must apply its regulations evenhandedly
in order to pass the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. 166 Treating like
cases differently must be either authorized by Congress or supported by
evidence. 167 The EPA previously created permit exemptions applicable
161 Cf Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 1992), 966 F.2d 1292, 1305 (9th CiT. 1992)
(expressing doubt over whether a light industry would be forthcoming in demonstrating that its site
was exempt and over whether the EPA would inspect the site to see if the light industrial site was
within the permit exemption).
162 Cj Michael Steeves, The EPA's Proposed CAFO Regulations Fall Short of Ensuring the
Integrity of Our Nation's Waters, 22 1. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 367, 390 (2002) (stating that
CAFO operators must develop a plan demonstrating how they will prevent waste runoff in order to
be exempt from permit requirements, and arguing that the lack of a permitting authority to ensure
compliance with the exemption requirements will weaken the regulation and open the door for
discharges to go unregulated).
163 Cj id. (arguing that discharges will go unregulated if there is no permitting scheme to
provide some oversight by a governmental agency).
164 NRDC 2008,526 F.3d at 607.
165 See 33 U.S.C.A. § 131 I (a) (Westlaw 2008) (stating that pollutant discharges are prohibited
unless such discharges are in compliance with the named sections of the CWA).
166 See Indep. Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(holding that when an administrating agency fails to evenhandedly apply a requirement in two cases
that are functionally indistinguishable, the agency's actions are deemed arbitrary and capricious).
167 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 1992), 966 F.2d 1292, 1304-05 (9th
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to one group and not to others that were similar in nature without
justification. 168 The Ninth Circuit struck down this preferential treatment
as arbitrary and capricious. 169 Despite the court's holding against
preferential treatment in the EPA's permit exemption, the EPA created a
permit exemption applicable only to oil and gas construction and not to
other types of construction, such as housing developments. This action
constitutes impermissible preferential treatment.
A. THE EPA ACTED OUTSIDE ITS DUTIES WHEN IT FAILED TO
APPL Y THE PERMIT EXEMPTION EVENHANDEDLY

"The treatment of cases A and B, where the two cases are
functionally indistinguishable, must be consistent. That is the very
meaning of the arbitrary and capricious standard.,,170 Courts have found
that an administrating agency acts arbitrarily when it fails to apply its
regulations evenhandedly. For example, in Independent Petroleum Ass 'n
of America v. Babbitt, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia struck down the Department of the Interior's ("DOl") decision
to collect royalties from settlement payments that a gas producer
received when releasing a pipeline company from its contract. 171
Royalties to DOl were due when gas was physically removed from the
ground and sold.172 The court emphasized that the trigger for payment of
royalties was when there was actual gas production. l73 The court found
that settlement payments were analogous to take-or-pay payments with
respect to collection of royalties. 174 Take-or-pay payments were made
when a pipeline company failed to purchase gas and were not linked to
physical extraction of gas. 175 Because there was no physical extraction
of gas, the DOl did not require royalties on take-or-pay payments. 176
Similarly, the court found no link between the physical gas extractions
Cir. 1992). The EPA's permit exemption for light industries was not extended to the entire industry
class. The court stated that "[ w]ithout supportable facts, we are unable to rely on our usual
assumption that the EPA has rationally exercised the duties delegated to it by Congress." Id.
168 !d.
169 1d.
170lndep. Petroleum, 92 F.3d at 1260.
171 Id. at 1250.
172 See id. at 1259 (referencing Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159
(5th Cir.), in which the Fifth Circuit held that no royalties were due on settlement payments or takeor-pay payments because gas was not physically severed from the ground at the time of payment).
173 1d.
174 1d. at 1260.
Id. at 1253.
176 See id. ("No royalty is due on take-or-pay payments unless and until gas ... is actually
produced and taken.").
17S
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and settlement payments. 177 The D.C. Circuit held that the DOl's
decision was arbitrary and capricious because the DOl failed to
demonstrate how settlement payments were functionally different from
take-or-pay payments that would support royalties in conjunction with
settlement payments. 178
Similarly, in 1992 the Ninth Circuit rejected the EPA's attempt to
exempt light industries from permit requirements because the EPA failed
to support its distinction between light and heavy industries. 179 This is
the same case in which the Ninth Circuit found that the EPA lacked an
adequate permitting scheme to ensure a light industry was in compliance
with the permit exemption. The EPA required permits for light industrial
activities only if the work areas or materials were actually exposed to
storm water. 180 The EPA assumed that because light industrial activities
primarily occurred indoors, exposure to storm waters would be
minimal. 181 However, the Ninth Circuit found that the EPA failed to
support its contention that light industry facilities would have minimal
exposure to storm water. 182 In addition, the EPA provided no supporting
evidence for its assumptions that light industries should be treated
differently from other industries, which were subject to permit
requirements. 183 Without support for its contentions, the court was
unable to conclude that the EPA was acting within its duties. 184 As a
result, the Ninth Circuit held the EPA's actions in distinguishing light
industrial activities from other industrial activities and providing storm
water permitting exemptions were arbitrary and capricious. 185
In the present case, the EPA never explained why oil and gas
construction sites were significantly different from other types of
construction sites in a way that would justify exempting the former, but
not the latter, from permit requirements for sediment-only discharges. 186
Id. at 1260.
1d.
179 Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 1992), 966 F.2d 1292, 1305 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding the EPA's exemption for light industries was arbitrary and capricious).
180 1d. at 1304.
181
1d.
177

178

1d. at 1305.
1d. at 1305 ("Without supportable facts, we are unable to rely on our usual assumption that
the EPA has rationally exercised the duties delegated to it by Congress. To exempt these industries
from the normal permitting process based on an unsubstantiated assumption about ... this group of
facilities is arbitrary and capricious. ").
184 Id. at 1305.
185
1d.
186 NRDC et a!.'s Response to Petition for Rehearing, Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA
(NRDC
2008),
526 F.3d 591(9th CiT. 2008) (No. 06-73217), availaole at
http://www.epa.gov/npdeslpubs/oilandgas_nrdcbrief.pdf (referring to the EPA's findings and
182
183

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2009

27

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 3

328

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

The EPA conceded that construction activity was industrial in nature and
that it was not free to create permit exemptions for these activities. ls7
The EPA had even gone so far as to recognize oil and gas construction
sites as prime candidates for NPDES permit for having serious water
quality impacts. ISS Yet despite these prior statements, the EPA remained
silent as to why oil and gas construction sites should be treated
differently from other types of construction sites where storm water
discharge permits were required for sediment-only discharges. Without
support for the distinction, the EPA had not acted within its lawful duties
under the CWA. In addition, unless otherwise refuted by the EPA,
sediment-only discharges from an oil and gas construction site and any
other construction site are indistinguishable and must be regulated
evenhandedly.ls9
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT HAD A DUTY TO STOP THE EPA FROM
TREATING LIKE CASES DIFFERENTLY
The court has a judicial duty to stop agencies from arbitrarily
treating similarly situated cases differently.19o A court must consider
how an agency's regulation or action is applied among an entire class in
order to determine if the agency acted arbitrarily. In doing so, the court
must require that the agency provide support for its decision to treat like
cases differently before the court can extend deference to the agency.191
For example, in Distrigas of Massachusetts Corp. v. Federal Power
Commission, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the
Federal Power Commission's action that required Distrigas to comply
with the Commission's reporting requirements for its liquefied natural
gas ("LNG") transaction. 192 The court found that the Commission
statements that sediment causes serious water quality problems).
187 NRDC 1992,966 F.2d at 1306.
188 NRDC 2008, 526 F.3d at 607.
189 See Indep. Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248, 1260 (~.C. Cir. 1996) ("The
treatment of cases A and B, where the two cases are functionally indistinguishable, must be
consistent. That is the very meaning of the arbitrary and capricious standard. ").
190 See 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A)-(O) (Westlaw 2009) (outlining when the reviewing court must
find an agency's action as unlawful, which include actions that are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse
of discretion).
191 See Oistrigas of Mass. Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 517 F.2d 761, 766 (Ist Cir. 1975)
(vacating the Commission's decision to deny the petitioner'S request because the Commission
offered no explanation as to why it approved one request and denied a similar request).
192 See id. at 765 (referencing the Commission's prior authorization of applying section 2.68
of the Commission's General Policies and Interpretations, which stated that the Commission would
provide minimal oversight over the reporting requirements for emergency gas sales, to LNG
transactions before and around the time of this case).
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exempted similar LNG transactions from the Commission's reporting
requirements around the same time that the Commission denied
Distrigas's request. 193 However, the Commission offered no explanation
as to why it approved similar requests but denied Distrigas's request to
be exempt from reporting requirements. 194 The court stated that this
action "resulted in inconsistent treatment of similarly situated parties to
the detriment of [Distrigas].,,195 The First Circuit held that the
Commission could exclude LNG transactions from reporting requirement
exemptions so long as the Commission sets forth polices with sufficient
clarity for the exclusion and must apply its regulations evenhandedly.196
In NRDC v. EPA, the Ninth Circuit should have admonished the
EPA to ensure its regulations or exemptions are applied consistently and
evenhandedly. This is an important consideration in this case because
this was the second time that the EPA attempted to carve out an
exemption for one segment of an industry while not extending it to the
rest of the industry. Because the Ninth Circuit failed to address the lack
of evenhanded application of the exemption, the door is open for the
EPA to take a similar action in the future.
The EPA must consider whether its regulations are evenly applied
among similarly situated groupS.197 With regard to the hypothetical
example at the beginning of this Note, the local municipality would be
expending its resources to comply with storm water permit requirements
in order to minimize sediment from running off the site and into the
stream. Yet the private energy company, which is also discharging
sediment from its site, would not have to spend time and money fulfilling
permit requirements as a result of the EPA's permit exemption for oil
and gas construction sites. This situation does not make sense from a
practical point of view. In addition, the permit exemption confers a
benefit onto one party to the detriment of another. In situations like
these, courts must require administrating agencies to apply their
regulations evenhandedly to prevent this type of impermissible
treatment. In the future, if the EPA opts to distinguish one group from
193 See id. ("The Commission has construed the regulation in other instances in precisely the
opposite manner from here. Thus it has authorized applying section 2.68 to LNG transactions in
letter rulings issued before at about the same time, and after the contrary ruling in this case.").
194 [d. at 766 ("But the Commission has presented no information as to how or why those
cases differed from the instant ones. ").
195 [d.
196 [d. ("If with respect to future transactions the Commission wishes to exclude LNG from
the operation of section 2,68, it may do so by promulgating a new or revised rule setting forth its
policies with sufficient clarity to ensure evenhanded treatment.").
197 See id. at 765 ("[An administrative agency] has a duty to define and apply its policies in a
minimally responsible and evenhanded way.").
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another when enacting its regulations, it must provide support for this
action in order to meet the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. 198

v. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit rightly struck down the EPA's permit exemption
for oil and gas construction sites as arbitrary and capricious primarily
because the EPA attempted to change its long-standing position that
sediment is a pollutant that must be regulated. The permit exemption
was also contrary to the goal of the CWA of preventing unlawful
Furthermore, the EPA lacked a
discharge of known pollutants.
permitting scheme that would ensure compliance with the CW A.
Although not addressed by the Ninth Circuit, another reason the
EPA's permit exemption was arbitrary and capricious is that it carved out
an exemption for oil and gas construction sites without support as to why
the exemption was not extended to other construction sites. By failing to
address this issue, the court may have left the door open for the EPA to
attempt to create similar permit exemptions without considering if it is
applying the exemptions evenhandedly. The court has a duty to stop an
administrative agency from treating like cases differently. Therefore, the
court must be deliberate in analyzing the fairness aspect of any permit
exemptions to ensure administrating agencies, like the EPA, apply their
regulations evenhandedly.

*MAR y LIM

198 See Indep. Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(asserting that treating like cases differently is arbitrary and capricious).
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